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Abstract – A multi-secret sharing scheme, which is
based on one-dimensional reversible cellular automata
with memory, allowing any member of a set of partic-
ipants to share a secret color image with the rest of
participants is presented. Moreover, it is also explained
that with this scheme, any participant is able to recover
all the secret color images if and only if the whole
set of participants pools their shadows. Finally, the
security of the multi-secret sharing scheme is studied
and it is proved that the protocol withstands the most
important attacks. In particular, it is secure against
any statistical attack.
Keywords: Graphic cryptography, Multi-secret sharing
schemes, One-dimensional cellular automata.
1. Introduction and Preliminaries
It is well known that secret sharing schemes are
cryptographic protocols that permit to share a secret
among a set of participants. In the protocol, specific
subsets of participants can recover the secret. These
schemes were proposed by Shamir ([18]) and Blakley
([4]). In the origin, their purpose was to safeguard
secret data from loss. Nevertheless, secret sharing
schemes are used today in many applications, specially
in access control, opening safety devices, etc.
An extension of the previous protocol occurs when
the set of participants wants to share several secrets
and not only one. In this case, the scheme is called a
multi-secret sharing scheme.
The most extended protocols of (multi)secret shar-
ing schemes are the (k,n)-threshold schemes, where
k,n ∈ Z, and 1 ≤ k ≤ n. In these protocols, a Dealer
computes n secret shadows from the original secrets
and distributes them, in a secure way, to n participants.
Then, any k, or more, participants can recover the
original secrets by pooling their shadows; whereas any
group of k−1, or fewer, participants cannot recover the
original secrets.
A (k,n)-threshold scheme is called ideal if the size
of each shadow is the same as the size of the original
secret, and it is said perfect if the knowledge of any
k−1, or fewer, shadows provides no information about
the original secret (see [16], [19]).
When the secrets are images, photos or figures, these
schemes are called graphic secret sharing schemes.
The first proposal for a graphic secret sharing
scheme is known as visual cryptography ([17]). This
scheme is a (k,n)-threshold scheme and it is perfect
but not ideal. Since then, many modifications and
improvements have been proposed in order to solve
some problems related to the contrast of the recovered
secret images, the number of colors of the original
image, etc. (see [2], [6], [7], [14], [15], [20], [23]).
In the last years several (multi)secret sharing
schemes have been proposed but mostly aimed at shar-
ing texts. Only a few of them targeted sharing images.
Some of the former ones are based on hash functions
([9], [11], [12]), Lagrange interpolation ([10], [26]),
coding theory ([8]), and on the RSA cryptosystem
([13]). Among the latter, the schemes presented in
[5], [22] were based on visual cryptography, and the
proposed in [25] is defined for multi-users with the
purpose of being used in watermarking schemes.
In this work, we present a multi-secret sharing
scheme based on one-dimensional reversible cellular
automata that allows the sharing of secret color images.
In fact, the proposed scheme is an (n,n)-threshold
scheme. The shadows computed are again color images
and they are obtained as configurations of the cellular
automata considered.
More specifically, our proposal assumes that a
Dealer and n ≥ 1 participants, P1, . . . ,Pn, exist such
that each participant has a secret image defined by any
number of colors, I1, . . . , In. Each participant wants to
share his secret image on condition that he could access
to the rest of images if all participants agree to do so.
In [3], a multisecret sharing scheme based also
on cellular automata was proposed. That scheme is
ideal, perfect and secure. Nevertheless, it has some
restrictions which have been improved in the present
proposal, as it will be explained below.
Our proposal can be used in other applications. For
example, if several secrets must be protected by using
the same information as if only one secret must be
protected, and a secret key can be used to encrypt such
secrets. Another application case occurs if the size of
the secret to be protected is so big that it becomes
convenient or necessary to split it into several parts.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Sec-
tion II the basic concepts related to one-dimensional
reversible cellular automata are recalled. In Section III
the proposed multi-secret sharing scheme is presented.
Some experimental examples are shown is Section IV
and the security of the scheme is analyzed in Section
V. Finally, the conclusions are shown in Section VI.
2. One-dimensional reversible cellular au-
tomata
Finite cellular automata (CA) are discrete dynamical
systems formed by a finite number of identical objects
called cells ([24]). These cells have a state which
changes at every discrete time step according to a
deterministic rule.
A one-dimensional finite cellular automata (CA) is
a set A = (C,S,V, f ), where C is the cellular space
formed by a linear array of m cells. Each cell is denoted
by 〈 j〉, 0≤ j ≤m−1. S is the state set, i.e., the set of
all possible values of the cells. In general, if the CA
considered is finite with p states, then S = Zp. The
ordered finite set V = {α1,α2, . . . ,αd} ⊂Z, with |V |=
d, is the set of indices of C so that the neighborhood of
a cell 〈 j〉 is the ordered set of d cells around the given
cell: V¯ = {a j+α1 , . . . ,a j+αd}, where a j stands for the
state of the cell 〈 j〉. In general, we denote by a(t)j ∈
S the state of the cell 〈 j〉 at time t and by V¯ (t) =
{a(t)j+α1 , . . . ,a
(t)
j+αd}, its neighborhood at the same time.
Finally, the local transition function f : Sd → S is
the function determining the evolution of the CA
throughout the time, i.e., f permits to determine the
changes of the states of every cell taking the states of
its neighbors into account. In this way, the state of the
cell a j in the time t +1 is given by the formula:
a(t+1)j = f
(
V¯ (t)
)
= f
(
a(t)j+α1 , . . . ,a
(t)
j+αd
)
. (1)
In general, the evolution of a CA considers that the
state of every cell at time t + 1 depends on the state
of its neighborhood at time t, V¯ (t). Nevertheless, it is
possible to consider that this evolution also depends on
the states of other cells at times t− 1, t− 2, . . . , t− l,
for example. In this case, it is said that the CA is a CA
with memory of order l+1 (the CA needs to remember
l+1 configurations to determine the next one), and its
transition function (see (1)) can be represented as:
a(t+1)j =
l
∑
h=0
f (t−h)
(
V¯ (t−h)
)
, (2)
where each f (t−h) is a specific local transition function.
As the cellular space is finite with m cells, boundary
conditions must be established in order to ensure
that the evolution of the cellular automata is well-
defined. Here, periodic boundary conditions are taken
into account. That is, If i≡ j (mod m) then a(t)i = a(t)j .
The set of states of all cells in a time t is called
the configuration at time t and it is represented by the
following vector:
C(t) =
(
a(t)0 ,a
(t)
1 , . . . ,a
(t)
m−1
)
∈ S× (m· · ·×S.
In particular, C(0) is called the initial configuration and
the evolution of A is the sequence
E∞ =
(
C(0),C(1),C(2), . . .
)
.
If C is the set of all possible configurations of the
CA, the global function of the CA is defined as a linear
transformation,
Φ : C → C , Φ(C(t)) =C(t+1)
that gives the configuration at the next time step during
the evolution of the CA. If Φ is bijective then the CA
is called reversible and there exists another cellular
automaton, called its inverse, with global function Φ−1,
such that the backward evolution is possible ([1], [21]).
3. A graphic multi-secret sharing scheme
In this section, a graphic multi-secret sharing
scheme is proposed. Our proposal is a (n,n)-threshold
scheme such that each participant P1, . . . ,Pn shares a
secret color image, I1, . . . , In with the rest of partici-
pants. In the scheme, the whole set of participants can
recover all secret images only when all of them agree
to share their shadows.
The scheme proposed in [3] is based on two-
dimensional cellular automata whereas the one pro-
posed in this work uses only one-dimensional ones.
This fact permits to define more efficient algorithms to
compute the shadows than in the previous case. With
our proposal, each participant can use their own secret
key instead of using the value generated by the Dealer.
In previous proposals, the bitlength of that value was
exactly 9 bits. This value was fixed because it must be
equal to the number of elements of the neighborhood
of each cell, which was Moore neighborhood. In our
proposal, the bitlength of the secret key chosen for each
participant can be different and, hence, the security of
the system is improved.
The scheme has been divided into three phases:
Definition, Sharing and Recovering.
3.1. Definition phase
In this phase, the Dealer defines the reversible one-
dimensional CA with memory of order n+1 to be used
in the scheme, A = (C,S,V, f ). In order to do this, he
receives the n secret images, Ii, 1≤ i≤ n, and the secret
keys of each participant for the scheme, ki. If the keys
are similar to those used in symmetric cryptography,
and if we denote their bitlength as li, then li will
be an element of the set {32,64,128,192,256}. If
a participant does not send their secret key to the
Dealer, the Dealer will generate a secret value for that
participant and he will send it to the participant at the
end of the sharing phase.
The next step to be done by the Dealer is the
normalization of the secret images. In fact, it is very
likely that the secret images have different sizes and
color palettes. This normalization converts all the se-
cret images into images of the same size (for example,
by padding them with white pixels), and saves all the
images in files with the largest color palette used.
In this way if the image Ii, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is a black
and white, grey or color image, defined by mi = ri×ci
pixels, it can be represented by a linear array of mi pi
bits, where pi is the number of bits needed to define
each pixel, that is, pi ∈{1,8,24}. Hence, all the images
can be considered as images defined by m bits, where
m = max(mi) ·max(pi). Hence, the cellular space of
the CA, C, will be a linear array of bits of size m and
the state set is given by S = Z2.
There are two more elements needed to complete the
CA: the set of indices, V , and the transition function,
f . In general, V and f are unique for each CA;
nevertheless, since in our proposal, n participants will
take part in the process and each of them with their
own key, ki, n sets of indices and n transition functions
will be considered, one for each participant. Both, V
and f , will depend on the value of ki.
If the secret key of the participant Pi is ki, with
bitlength li (which must be an even number), the set
of indices considered, for a cell 〈 j〉 given, is
Vi = {〈 j− li/2〉, . . . ,〈 j−1〉,〈 j〉,〈 j+1〉, . . . ,〈 j+ li/2〉} ,
so that the neighborhood of a cell a j at time t is
V¯ (t)i =
{
a(t)j−li/2, . . . ,a
(t)
j−1,a
(t)
j ,a
(t)
j+1, . . . ,a
(t)
j+li/2
}
.
Then, V¯ (t) = {V¯ (t)1 , . . . ,V¯ (t)n }, where |V¯ (t)i |= li +1.
In order to define the transition function f , one can
use the expression given in (2) modifying it a suitable
way. To do this, we define a transition function for
each participant Pi, 1≤ i≤ n, as follows:
f (t)(V¯ (t)i ) = fki(V¯
(t)
i )
= fki
(
a(t)j−li/2, . . . ,a
(t)
j−1,a
(t)
j ,a
(t)
j+1, . . . ,a
(t)
j+li/2
)
= bi,li−1a
(t)
j−li/2 +bi,li−2a
(t)
j−1−li/2 + . . .+bi,li/2a
(t)
j−1
+a(t)j +bi,li/2−1a
(t)
j+1 + . . .+bi,1a
(t)
j−1+li/2 +bi,0a
(t)
j+li/2
,
where (bi,li−1,bi,li−2, . . . ,bi,1,bi,0)2 is the expression of
ki in the binary base, i.e.,
ki =
li−1
∑
h=0
bi,h2h.
Then, the transition function of A , f , is as follows
a(t+1)j = f (V¯ )
= fk0
(
V¯ (t)0
)
+
n
∑
h=1
fkh
(
V¯ (t−h)h
)
(mod 2), (3)
where fk0 is the identity: fk0
(
V¯ (t)0
)
= fk0
(
a(t)j
)
= a(t)j .
This way of defining the transition function of A ,
f , permits to define its inverse CA by considering the
transition function g of A −1 = (C,S,V,g) given by
a¯(t+1)j = g(V¯ )
= fk0
(
V¯ (t−n)0
)
−
1
∑
h=n
fkh
(
V¯ (t+h−n)h
)
(mod 2). (4)
3.2. Sharing phase
Once the CA is defined, the Dealer must compute
the shadows to be shared in a secure way to the n
participants. To do this, he generates a random bit
sequence of length m, I0, and considers that this is
the initial configuration of the CA defined above, i.e.,
C(0) = I0. The other secret images are the next n
configurations of the reversible one-dimensional CA
with memory of order n+1. So, C(i) = Ii, 0≤ i≤ n.
Then, the Dealer generates an integer number, e,
in order to determine the number of iterations to be
applied to the CA, that is, the order of its evolution.
This number must be greater than n + 1 in order to
avoid that any of the secret images might be considered
as a shadow; hence, e> n+1. So, the Dealer computes
the evolution of the CA of order e− 1 from the last
configuration known, applying the transition function
defined in (3), and he obtains:
En+e =
(
C(0), . . . ,C(n),C(n+1), . . . ,C(e), . . . ,C(n+e−1),
)
.
Since C(0) is a random bit sequence, so are the
configurations C( j), n+1≤ j ≤ n+ e−1.
After computing the evolution En+e, the Dealer
sends to each participant one of the last n config-
urations computed, and the number of order of that
participant through a secure channel. If the participant
did not send to the Dealer any secret key, the Dealer,
will send that secret to him.
In this way, each participant Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, receives
the configuration C(i+e−1), which is the shadow S(n−i).
Finally, the Dealer publishes the configuration C(e−1) =
S(n) so that the following phase can be carried out.
3.3. Recovering phase
If the whole set of n participants agrees to recover all
the secret images, they can proceed as follows. Recall
that if only one of the participants does not agree,
no secret image will be recovered since the proposed
scheme is an (n,n)-threshold scheme.
All participants know the public configuration S(n) =
C(e−1); so to proceed, they share their shadows and
their secret keys: S(n−i) and ki, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where
S(n−i) = C(i+e−1). Next, they use a CA which is the
inverse of the one used by the Dealer in the Definition
phase, A −1 = (C,S,V,g), and iterate it (e−2) times,
computing the evolution of order n+ e− 2 by using
the transition function given in (4). Note that in this
phase, the participants do not need to compute the
original initial configuration C(0) because it is not a
secret image but it is the random binary sequence
generated by the Dealer in the Definition phase. Hence,
they obtain
E¯n+e−1 =
(
S(0), . . . ,S(n),S(n+1), . . . ,S(e), . . . ,S(n+e−2)
)
thus recovering the n secret images as C( j) =
S(n+e− j−1), 1≤ j ≤ n.
4. Experimental results
In this section we will present the results obtained
with an implementation of the scheme described in the
previous section. To do this, we will use three different
images defined by a different number of pixels and
different color palettes.
The images of the n = 3 participants are the follow-
ing. The first participant has the logo of WorldComp
2009, I1, which is an image defined by only two colors
and with 262× 96 pixels (see Fig. 1) and he has not
any secret key. The second participant, with a key, k2,
of l2 = 64 bits, chooses a map of Madrid in the year
1562, I2. This engraving is a grey level image (actually
253 different grey tones) and it has 700× 400 pixels
(see Fig. 2). Finally, the third participant has a photo of
Las Vegas (see Fig. 3) with 71391 colors and 413×400
pixels, I3; his secret key, k3, has also l3 = 64 bits.
Figure 1: Logo of WorldComp 2009.
Figure 2: Map of Madrid in 1562.
Figure 3: Photo of Las Vegas.
Once the Dealer has received the secret images,
he normalizes them so that the secret images are
defined by 700×400 pixels and each pixel is defined
by 24 bits. Then, he generates a secret key for the
first participant: k1. From the three keys, the Dealer
defines the reversible one-dimensional CA follow-
ing the steps given in §3.1. The value of the keys
used in this example, in hexadecimal base, are: k1 =
6c344d36c3bf1672, k2 = cdcbeb3edaaa20c9,
and k3 =8cf6a3730301b941. Hence, the transition
function of the CA is
f (V¯ ) = fk1(V
(t)
1 )+ fk2(V
(t)
2 )+ fk3(V
(t)
3 )+ fk0(V
(t)
0 );
where fk2 , for example, is given by
fk2
(
V¯ (t)2
)
= 1 ·a(t)j−32 +1 ·a(t)j−31 +0 ·a(t)j−30 +0 ·a(t)j−29
+ . . .+1 ·a(t)j−1 +a(t)j +1 ·a(t)j+1 + . . .+1 ·a(t)j+29
+0 ·a(t)j+30 +0 ·a(t)j+31 +1 ·a(t)j+32.
In the sharing phase, the Dealer generates a random
bit sequence, I0 =C(0), of m = 700 ·400 ·24 = 6720000
bits; chooses e = 6 > n + 1 = 4; and determines the
evolution or order n+e−1 = 9 of the CA. So, he only
has to compute 5 configurations, C(4), C(5), C(6), C(7),
and C(8), since he knows the n = 3 first images and
the random initial configuration: I j =C( j), 0≤ j ≤ 3.
Then, the shadow C(5) = S(3) is published, whereas
the shadows to be distributed to the participant P1 is
C(6) = S(2), to the participant P2 is C(7) = S(1), and to
the participant P3 is C(8) = S(0) (v.gr. see Fig. 4).
Figure 4: Public shadow S(3).
To recover the original images, if the three partici-
pants agree, they only have to share their shadows and
keys, and to follow the recovering phase.
5. Security
In this section we study the behavior of the proposed
scheme with respect to its security.
If all the secret images are of the same size and de-
fined with the same palette, it is clear that the proposed
scheme is ideal since all the shadows are of the same
size and defined by the same palette. Otherwise, the
scheme is not ideal. Moreover, the scheme is perfect
since if, at least, one shadow belonging to a participant
is unknown, there is no information about the whole
configuration of the CA and then it is not possible to
determine the evolution of the CA.
Next, we analyze the statistical security of the
scheme. This analysis is performed by three tests. The
first test is based on the number of colors of each
shadows and on a comparison between the histograms
of the secret images and the shadows; the second
one has been designed in order to test the influence
of one modified pixel on the shadow; and the third
test consists of computing the correlations of adjacent
pixels (horizontal, vertical and diagonal) of the original
images and the shadows. Table 1 shows the number of
colors of each image.
Table 1: Number of colors of each shadow of a
maximum of 280000
Image S(3) S(2) S(1) S(0)
Colors 277602 277600 277682 277714
The histograms of the secret images and of the
shadows S(3) and S(2) are given in Figs. 5–6. They
show that the histograms of the shadows are fairly
uniform and significantly different from the histograms
of the original images. The histograms represent the
number of pixels (y-axis) for each pixel (x-axis) given
by its RGB value (0–255).
Figure 5: Histograms of Logo, Madrid and Las Vegas.
Figure 6: Histograms of shadows S(3) and S(2).
The next test has been designed in order to test
the influence on a shadow by the change of one
pixel. The test consists of two values: the Number of
Pixels Change Rate, NPCR and the Unified Average
Changing Intensity, UACI. The former measures the
percentage of different pixel numbers between two
images, whereas the latter gives a measure about the
average intensity of differences between two images.
The values of NPCR and UACI are computed as
follows: If S = (si j) and S¯ = (s¯i j) are two shadows
obtained from the original secrets that differ in only
one pixel, the bipolar array of size r× c, D = (di j),
is defined by considering that di j = 0 if si j = s¯i j, and
di j = 1 otherwise. The NPCR and UACI are:
NPCR =
∑ri=1∑
c
j=1 di j
r · c ×100%,
UACI =
1
r · c
(
r
∑
i=1
c
∑
j=1
| si j− s¯i j |
number of colors
)
×100%,
It is clear that a high value of NPCR (near 100%)
and a high value of UACI (bigger than 25%) represents
that the change of a pixel in the secret image influences
significantly in the shadows. As in these experimental
results, the values are bigger than 99% and 33%,
respectively, we can state that the proposed scheme
is very sensitive with respect to small changes in the
secret images.
Given that the initial configuration C(0) = I0 is gener-
ated at random, these tests are not particularly relevant
for the current proposal. However, for the sake of
completeness we have executed these tests. The results
for the NPCR test and for the UACI test comparing the
corresponding pairs of shadows are shown in Table 2
and Table 3, respectively.
Table 2: NPCR test comparing pairs of shadows
Shadows Red Green Blue
S(3)-S(3) 99.6071 99.6246 99.6186
S(2)-S(2) 99.6100 99.5936 99.6029
S(1)-S(1) 99.6046 99.6089 99.6029
S(0)-S(0) 99.6243 99.6036 99.6132
Table 3: UACI test comparing pairs of shadows
Shadows Red Green Blue
S(3)-S(3) 33.5395 33.3947 33.4954
S(2)-S(2) 33.5212 33.3933 33.5243
S(1)-S(1) 33.4910 33.4382 33.3890
S(0)-S(0) 33.4702 33.4764 33.4759
To test the correlation between a set of adjacent pix-
els, 1000 pairs of two vertically adjacent pixels, 1000
pairs of two horizontally adjacent pixels, and 1000
pairs of two diagonally adjacent pixels, for the original
image as well as for its shadows, have been randomly
selected. For each case, the correlation coefficient of
each pair has been computed and the results are shown
in Tables 4 and 5.
The results state that the correlation coefficients are
very different. For example, in the secret images the
correlation coefficients for two horizontally adjacent
pixels are 0.4114, 0.7364, and 0.9405 (note that these
coefficients are bigger if the image has more colors, as
expected). Nevertheless, in the four shadows, these co-
efficients are −0.0383, 0.0291, −0.0046, and 0.0151,
respectively. Similar results are obtained for vertically
and diagonally adjacent pixels.
Table 4: Correlation coefficients of adjacent pixels for
the secret color images
Image Logo Madrid Las Vegas
Horizontal 0.4114 0.7364 0.9405
Vertical 0.4774 0.6051 0.9612
Diagonal 0.3709 0.5344 0.9033
Table 5: Correlation coefficients of adjacent pixels for
the shadows
Shadows S(3) S(2) S(1) S(0)
Horizontal −0.0383 0.0291 −0.0046 0.0151
Vertical −0.0620 0.0060 0.0341 0.0355
Diagonal 0.0321 0.0051 −0.0629 −0.0217
As an example, Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 show the correla-
tion distribution of 1000 pairs of horizontally adjacent
pixels of secret images and shadows, respectively.
One can observe that in the first case (Fig. 7), the
distributions follow, approximately, the main diagonal,
which gives an idea of the strong correlation among the
pixels of the secret images; whereas for the shadows
(Fig. 8), the clouds of points seem to distribute in a
random way, which indicates a weak correlation among
the pixels of the shadows.
Figure 7: Correlation of horizontally adjacent pixels
for Madrid and Las Vegas secret images.
6. Conclusions
The most important conclusions of this work are:
Figure 8: Correlation of horizontally adjacent pixels
for shadows S(3)–S(0).
1) A graphic multi-secret scheme based on re-
versible one-dimensional cellular automata has
been proposed.
2) This scheme is an (n,n)-threshold scheme and it
is ideal-like and perfect.
3) The statistical properties of this scheme have
been studied and it has been proved that the
multi-secret sharing scheme is secure against
statistical attacks.
4) Moreover, in the proposed scheme, each partic-
ipant can use their own secret key with chosen
bitlength, instead of using the value generated
by the Dealer, with a fixed bitlength 9. So, the
security is improved.
Some future works are:
• Study how to extend this scheme to general (k,n)-
threshold schemes with k < n.
• Improve the implementation of the algorithms
used.
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